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Court Ordered Non.Emergency Medical Care
for Infants
James A. Baker*
T HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED that a privilege to act is a perfect defense
to liability for a non-consensual, intentional interference with another
person. This privilege is based upon self defense,' defense of third per-
sons,2 mistake,3 or various other recognized legal theories. Even a state
may have a privilege to interfere with the person of a citizen, and this
privilege may extend to an interference to provide an infant citizen with
medical care without the consent of, or against the express wishes of, the
parent or guardian.
Perhaps the most highly publicized modern, non-consensual, emer-
gency medical care case is State v. Perricone.4 This case involved the
state's privilege to order an emergency blood transfusion for an infant
who would undoubtedly either die or be mentally impaired without it,
against the express wishes of the infant's parents, who were Jehovah
Witnesses. The New Jersey State Supreme Court, in affirming the trial
court's decision while an appeal was pending in the Appellate Division,
held that under the New Jersey Child Neglect Statute,5 the infant was
a neglected child, and the state was privileged to interfere with emer-
gency medical care. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the Perricone
case, raised but did not decide the further question of whether a state
is privileged to interfere with non-emergency (corrective or preventive)
medical care of infant citizens:
True, not every refusal to consent to treatment for an infant
constitutes evidence of unfitness or neglect to provide proper pro-
tection. For example, refusals to permit corrective surgery for a
congenital arm deformity (In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d
765 (Sup. Ct. 1942)) and to correct rachitis (In re Tuttendario, 21
Pa. Dist. 561 (Q. S. Phila. Co. 1911)) have been held insufficient
grounds for taking custody from the parents.6
*B.S.ME., Ohio Northern Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
I Fraguglia v. Sala, 17 Cal. App. 2d 738, 62 P. 2d 783 (1936).
2 Frew v. Teagarden, 111 Kan. 107, 205 P. 1023 (1922).
3 Keep v. Quallman, 68 Wis. 451, 32 N.W. 233 (1887).
4 State v. Perricone, 37 NJ. 463, 181 A. 2d 751, cert. denied 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Note,
Parent and Child-State's Right to Take Custody of a Child in Need of Medical Care,
12 DePaul L. Rev. 342 (1963).
5 The statute applicable to this matter, N.J.S:A. 9:2-9, reads as follows:
When the parents of any minor child or the parent or other person having
actual care and custody of any minor child are grossly immoral or unfit to be
intrusted with the care and education of such child, or shall neglect to provide
the child with proper protection, maintenance and education, * * *; it shall be
lawful for any person interested in the welfare of such child to institute an
(Continued on next page)
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It is this delicate issue, which was raised but was neither fully dis-
cussed nor decided in the Perricone case, that is currently the subject
of controversy and apparent conflict.
Basis of the States' Privilege to Interfere with Medical Care
of Infant Citizens
The state is not privileged at common law to interfere with the per-
son of an infant citizen by taking custody of the infant for failure of the
parents to provide adequate medical care, either in emergency or non-
emergency.7 This is true even though the state, in its role as parens
patriae, is responsible for the care of infants within its jurisdiction,8 and
even though the parents have a common law duty to provide their infant
children with necessaries which may include medical attention.9
In the absence of any common law privilege to remove the custody
of infant children from parents to provide medical care, the states at first
indirectly exerted their coercive power to compel parents to provide
adequate medical care for their infant children by enacting criminal
penal statutes.10 These criminal statutes had the obvious deficiency of
(Continued from preceding page)
action in the Superior Court or the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in
the county where such minor child is residing, for the purpose of having the
child brought-before the court, and for further relief provided by this chapter.
The court may proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise.
6 State v. Perricone, supra, note 4 at 471-472, 181 A. 2d at 759-760.
7 People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); In re Rothowitz, 175 Misc. 948,
25 N.Y. Supp. 624 (1941); compare People ex. rel. O'Connel v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280
(1870) (fathers given power of life and death and sale over the children under early
Roman law).
8 Garnder v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 26 A. 2d 799 (Ct. of Chan. 1942); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E. 2d 769, cert. denied 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
But see In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (Quar. Sess., Phila. Co. 1911); Wade v.
State, 39 Wash. 2d 744, 238 P. 2d 914 (1951).
9 Potter v. Thomas, 164 N.Y. Supp. 923 (1917); Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala. App.
258, 170 So. 95 (1936); Greenspan v. Slate, 22 N.J. 344, 92 A. 2d 47 (1952); People v.
Pierson, supra, note 6; Hopkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 144 F. 2d 683
(6th Cir., 1944); In re Marsh, 140 Pa. Sup. 472, 14 A. 2d 368 (1940); 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries, § 447; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child, § 15(a) (1950); 39 Am. Jur. Parent
and Child § 47 (1942); But see Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q.B. 559 (1868); Cissna v.
Beaton, 2 Wash. 2d 491, 98 P. 2d 651 (1940) (parent under no common law obligation
to support child).
10 Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. 530, 32 J.P. 215 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1868) (parent
could not be convicted of a crime for refusing on religious grounds to provide med-
ical care for infant in the absence of a statutory provision); England's Children Act
of 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67) § 12, subs. 1, provided that any parent who neglects his child
"in a manner to cause injury to the child's health," is "guilty of a misdemeanor,"
and further that failure to provide "adequate medical aid" for his child "shall be
deemed to have neglected him in a manner likely to cause injury to his health." See
also People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (Ct. of App. 1903) for a discussion
of an early New York Penal Code providing that:
A person who (1) wilfully omits, without lawful excuse, to perform a duty,
by law imposed upon him, to furnish food, clothing, shelter, or medical attention
to a minor, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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punishing the guilty parent only after the harm, which was often irrep-
arable, had befallen the unfortunate child.
Although a parent is under no common law duty civilly enforceable
by a state to provide his infant children with proper medical care, this
harsh rule has been changed by modern statutes throughout the United
States. These statutes are based upon the police power of the state to
provide for the health, welfare, safety and morals of its citizens, and it
is so well established that these statutes represent a legitimate exercise
of that power that they may no longer be questioned on this basis."
These statutes vary greatly in their terms from state to state, but in the
final analysis they are nonetheless surprisingly uniform in their scope
and effect. Generally, these civil statutes contain provisions for the court
to deprive a parent of the custody of his infant child when the infant is
"neglected," "dependent," or when the parent has failed to provide
"necessaries." 12
There can no longer be any doubt that these statutes are constitu-
tional and do not conflict with the First Amendment guarantee of free-
dom of religion. 13 As stated in the Perricone case:
Thus the amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.
The right to practice religion freely does not include the liberty
to expose . . . a child . . . to ill health or death. Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves. 14 (Citations omitted.)
It is interesting to note that, although acting on religious beliefs is not
an acceptable defense for parents failing to provide proper medical care
for infant children, faith healing has been recognized in some criminal
child neglect cases as a defense to criminal liability for failing to provide
11 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1904); In re Vasko, 238 App.
Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A. 2d 751,
cert. denied 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Mitchell
v. Davis, 205 S.W. 2d 812 (1947); cf. 39 Am. Jur. Parent and Child § 15 (1942); cf.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1904) (compulsory vaccination permissible
under doctrine of self-defense).
12 Annot., 30 A. L. R. 2d 1138. The following statutes are representative of those
found throughout the United States: Ill. Rev. Stat. § 23 2001-15 (1961); Mo. R. S.§§ 211.010 to 211.300 (1949); N.J.S.A. §§ 9:2-9 to 9:2-11 (1948); N.D. Rev. Code§ 27-1608 (1943); Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.03 (1953); Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1987-1
et seq.; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14-29 (1958).
For a particularly thorough and enlightening discussion of the Ohio statute, see
1951 Opinions of the (Ohio) Attorney General 689.
13 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263
N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); State v. Perricone, supra note 4 at 468-469, 181 A. 2d at 756-
757; Note, op. cit. supra note 4.
14 State v. Perricone, supra note 4; Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A. 2d
140 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961); People v. Pierson, supra note 6.
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infants with proper medical care, 15 and in some civil cases as a consider-
ation for determining whether parents have exercised reasonable care in
protecting the recovery of their injured child.1"
In view of these statutes, the question of a state's privilege to order
corrective or preventive non-emergency medical care for infant citizens
becomes one of judicial interpretation of the applicable state statute.
Argument in Opposition to Extending the Privilege to
Non-Emergency Medical Care
The arguments presented in support of the proposition that the state
is not privileged to interfere with corrective or preventive non-
emergency medical care of its infant citizens without the consent or
against the will of its parents is well reasoned and authoritative.
The age-old maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed gives heavy support to this proposition. Since
these so-called "child neglect statutes" impose a burden upon the parents
which they did not suffer at the common law,1 7 the terms "neglected,"
"dependent," and "necessaries" should be narrowly defined. This was
recognized in Justice v. State,' which held that a father who refused to
provide medical care for any of his children was not guilty of a crime
under a penal statute making it a misdemeanor to deprive children of
a "necessary sustenance." The court reasoned that, although food, cloth-
ing and shelter could each be considered a "necessary sustenance," med-
ical care was not, since it is not a common necessity of survival.
Another early case arising out of a coercive, penal child neglect
statute is In re Tuttendario,19 a case arising out of the Pennsylvania Act
of June 11, 1879, P.L. 142, providing that "any person.., who shall...
wilfully abandon or neglect [an infant or minor child] . .. shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor." The parents of a seven-year old boy who was suffer-
ing from a deformity known as rickets, and who could probably be cured
15 Trescher and O'Neil, Medical Care for Dependent Children: Manslaughter Liabil-
ity of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. Pa. L. R. 203 (1960-61) (argument based upon
public acceptance of faith healing as medical care); Cawley, Criminal Liability in
Faith Healing, 39 Minn. L. R. 48 (1954); But see Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.
2d 684 (Ct. of App. 1959); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 203, 68 N.E. 246 (Ct. of App.
1903) stating:
We think therefore, that the medical attendance required by the (penal)Code is the authorized medical attendance prescribed by the statute (attendance
by registered physician).
16 Lange v. Hoyt, 144 Conn. 593, 159 A. 578 (1932), stating:
* * * courts cannot disregard theories as to proper curative method held by
a large number of reasonable and intelligent people. [Christian Scientist parent
found not to have exaggerated the injured condition of his infant child, struck
by an automobile, by delaying to furnish medical attention].
17 Supra note 9.
18 Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605, 42 S.E. 1013 (1902).
19 Supra. note 8.
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by an operation but who would be a cripple all of his life and unable to
provide for himself without an operation, refused to consent to the oper-
ation. The parents, who had suffered the early deaths of seven of their
ten children, exercised a good faith belief that the child might not sur-
vive the operation. In holding that the parents were not guilty under the
aforementioned penal statute, the court reasoned that the mere failure
to provide medical care without a "malicious intent" was not "neglect"
under the penal statute, and that the court could not supersede the par-
ents' good faith judgment, even though the boy would be rendered a
permanent cripple, since there is always some probability that a child
will die from an operation. In reaching this conclusion, the court rea-
soned that:
We have not yet adopted as a public policy the Spartan rule that
children belong not to their parents, but to the state. As the law
stands, the parents forfeit their natural right of guardianship only
in cases where they have shown their unfitness by reason of moral
depravity.20
The first authoritative modern case arising under a civil child neglect
statute is In re Hudson.21 Patricia Hudson was born with a congenital
deformity consisting of an abnormal growth of her entire left arm, which
made that arm larger and longer than the right arm and rendered it
absolutely useless. The child appeared to be frail and suffering from the
effects of this enormously heavy, useless extremity, which the doctors
advised should be removed. Her heart was burdened by reason of having
to pump blood to the large left arm and her chest was becoming de-
formed from carrying the enormous weight, but perhaps the greatest
burden to her was psychological. There was no effective medical treat-
ment other than amputation of the left arm, and the operation would
entail a fair degree of risk of life. The child's father, the child herself,
and all concerned desired the operation, except for the mother, who was
the dominating parent in that particular family and who wanted to wait
until the child could make the decision for herself.
The court concluded that under the applicable statute,22 the state
20 Ibid. at 563.
21 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942).
22 The pertinent language of the statute, Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1987-1 et seq., de-
fining the jurisdiction and power of the Juvenile Court, reads as follows:
The words "dependent child" shall mean any child under the age of 18 years:
(6) who is destitute; * * *
(7) whose home by reason of neglect, * * * of its parents or either of them * * *
is an unfit place for such child, * * *
(13) whose father, mother, guardian, or custodian * * * do not properly provide
for such child, and it appears that such child is destitute of a suitable home
* * * or where such child is without proper means of support; * * *
(18) * * * all delinquent and dependent children within the state shall be con-
sidered wards of the state and their person shall be subject to the custody,
care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided.
See also, Rev. Code of Wash. § 13.04.010 (1956).
May, 1969
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was not privileged to interfere with such non-emergency medical care
against the express wishes of the dominating parent. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that other cases had held that people were
not required to mitigate damages in personal injury actions by subjecting
themselves to risky operations. The court also placed heavy reliance
upon the fact that the analogous criminal statute made it a misdemeanor
for failing to provide medical care to a child under the age of 16 years,
and reasoned that since the legislature had not provided a similar pro-
vision for the Juvenile Court law, they must have intended no such
provision.
A dissenting opinion 23 took issue with the majority, and reasoned
that the civil and criminal statutes are separate entities enacted by the
legislature at different times and should not be interpreted in view of
one another.
The obvious question to be asked is, why didn't the court rely upon
provisions 7 and 13 of the statute and hold that the child's home was
unfit or that the child was not properly provided for? It is apparent that
two practical, if not legalistic, reasons may be advanced for this. First,
the majority opinion severely criticized the father for shirking his duty
to be the head of the household, and the mother for shifting the respon-
sibility of the decision to her daughter, in an obvious attempt to shame
the father into consenting to the operation. The second reason might be
that the court was suffering under the erroneous impression that since
everyone except the child's mother was desirous that the child be re-
quired to undergo an operation that she might not survive, "implicit in
their position is their opinion that it would be preferable that the child
die instead of going through life handicapped by the enlarged, deformed
left arm." If this implication were true, it might present a logical reason
for the decision. However, it is clearly in error, since the only thing that
may be implied from desiring the child to undergo the operation is that
it is preferable that the child submit herself to the chances of the opera-
tion rather than to go through life handicapped with the deformed left
arm.
The next modern case following In re Hudson is In re Frank,24 which
arose under the same statute. The maternal grandmother of the child
desired to have the child declared dependent and custody given to her
23 Supra note 21, 126 P. 2d at 792, where the dissenting opinion concluded that:
The welfare of Patricia Hudson depends that the operation be performed as
ordered by the trial court. Patricia is entitled to be put under a condition where
she can run and play, attend public school, and take part in school activities.
She is entitled to a healthy body, to secure a good education, to take her place
in American society, to grow up as a normal American girl, to get married, and
to have a home and children. Without an operation, all these things are denied
to her and she is condemned to travel along life's pathway a hopeless cripple,
an object of pity dependent upon either private or public charity.
24 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P. 2d 553 (1952).
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on the ground that the child had a speech impediment and that the father
had neglected to provide proper medical care. The trial court, apparently
in direct defiance of the prior decision rendered in In re Hudson, found
the child dependent and took custody away from the father. On appeal
to the Washington Supreme Court, the trial court decision was reversed,
the court reasoning that the child was not dependent, since the father
had no obligation to furnish medical attendance. Placing principal re-
liance on In re Hudson, the court again reasoned that ". . . the Juvenile
Court law excludes from its provisions a requirement to furnish medical
or surgical care, while in the penal section medical attendance is
included."
Aside from these two Washington cases, which uniformly hold that
the state is not privileged to interfere with non-emergency medical care
of infant citizens against the wishes of their parents, a search of the case
law has revealed only one other authoritative decision refusing to order
non-emergency medical care, and that is In re Seiferth.25 In this case,
the father of a boy who was 19 years of age and afflicted with a massive
hairlip and cleft palate, arbitrarily refused to allow surgery due to a
belief in mental healing. The father had inculcated the boy with a fear
of surgery, and after careful consideration the boy himself said that he
would prefer to wait. Operations such as this are normally performed
between the ages of one to three years, and it was already too late to
close the front portion of the cleft. However, there was no finding that
there would be any advantage other than psychological in performing
the operation presently rather than waiting for the boy to decide for
himself.
The trial court, after stating that an order for surgery would have
been granted without hesitation if the proceeding had been instituted
prior to the child's acquiring convictions of his own, stated that no oper-
ation would be ordered due to the difficulty in securing the child's co-
operation in post-operative rehabilitation. The appellate court reversed
and ordered surgery, and the Supreme Court of New York, in a four-
three decision, dismissed the petition on the same grounds as the trial
court had dismissed it.
A dissenting opinion reasoned that the child's consent was not neces-
sary or material by either statute2 6 or decision, and that the child, ob-
viously under the influence of his father, should not be allowed to "ruin
his life and any chance for a normal, happy existence; normalcy and hap-
piness... will unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement is not
remedied."
25 127 N.Y.S. 2d 63, rev'd., 284 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 35 (1955).
26 New York Children's Court Act (1922) § 2, subd. 4, defines a "neglected child"
as "- * * a child * * * (e) whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses,
when able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or hospital
care for such child."
May, 1969
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Argument in Favor of Extending the Privilege to
Non-Emergency Medical Care
"It is the particular genius and strength of the common law that no
decision is stare decisis when it has lost its usefulness in our social evo-
lution; it is distinguished, and if times have sufficiently changed, over-
ruled. Judicial opinions do not always preserve the social statistics of
another generation." 27 And so it is that, instead of being strictly con-
strued as statutes in derogation of the common law generally are, child
neglect statutes should "... be liberally construed to read the purpose of
[their] enactment." 28
The oldest case discovered which arose under a civil child neglect
statute is Heinemann's Appeal.29 This case arose under an early non-
penal child neglect statute,"0 providing that:
... Whensoever any husband or father.., shall neglect or refuse to
provide for his child or children . . . the proper court may appoint
a guardian of such children.
The case arose from an appeal by the father from a decree awarding
custody of his two children, five and eight years of age, to their maternal
grandmother. Sometime prior to this action, the oldest child of the re-
spondent had died. Five days thereafter, his wife had died, and shortly
thereafter, a second child had died. Some months after the death of his
second child, the youngest child had died, leaving just the two remaining
children. All of these members of the plaintiff's family had died of diph-
theria, and in each instance the father had notice of the seriousness of the
illness but never called a doctor "till death was at the door." Instead, he
treated them himself by the "Bannscheidt system," which "consisted of
pricking the skin of the patient on different parts of the body with an
instrument composed of about 30 needles, and operated by a spring, and
then rubbing the parts thus pricked with an irritating oil." The father
explained his failure to call a doctor by simply stating that he "... . had
not entire faith in the infallibility of the old school of physicians."
Even though the remaining two children were not sick, and even
though the court could have waited until medical attention was neces-
sary, the lower court decree awarding custody of the two children to
their maternal grandmother was affirmed. The court reasoned that neg-
lect to provide for the children included failure to provide proper medical
27 Carroll v. Electrical Workers, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 233 (Ct. of Chan. 1943).
28 43 C.J.S., Infants § 98; State v. Robertson, 13 S.W. 2d 566 (Mo. App. 1929).
29 96 Pa. 112, 42 Am. Rep. 532 (Ct. of App. 1880).
30 Third Section of the Pennsylvania Act of May 4, 1955, Pamph. L. 430, Pwd. Dig.
411.
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care, and that there was no reason to believe that the father would pro-
vide proper medical attendance if the children did become ill.
Demonstrating the coercive effect of the early penal child neglect
statutes in non-emergency cases is Oakley v. Jackson.3 1 The infant in-
volved in this case was suffering from adenoids, which were causing
mental dullness, impaired breathing, deafness, and some anemia. The
operation was not of a serious nature, although it would probably neces-
sitate anesthetic, but the parents nevertheless refused removal of the
adenoids. The court found the parents guilty under the Children Act of
1908,32 reasoning that:
... The question is one of fact to be decided in each case on the
evidence, and the Justices in deciding that question must take into
consideration the nature of the operation and the reasonableness of
the parents' refusal to permit it. (emphasis added)
The next attempt to establish the state's privilege to interfere with
corrective medical care of infants over the objections of their parents is
In re Vasko.33 A two-year old child was suffering from glioma of the
retina of the left eye, which had permanently blinded the left eye, and
the growth was probably malignant. Removal of the eye was recom-
mended by physicians, who said that the malignancy would eventually
cause the eye to burst and that there was no doubt that the child would
die of it sometime in the future if the operation was not performed.
However, the court made no findings as to the urgency of the operation.
Statistics showed a cure in about fifty per cent of the cases, but the
parents arbitrarily refused the operation. It was the first time that the
Appellate Court of the State of New York was called upon to decide if
parental refusal to have corrective surgery performed was child neglect
under the Children's Act of New York of 1922, which provided the first
affirmative statutory power in New York to exercise direct control over
the physical welfare of children rather than indirect control by punish-
ment of the parents.
In reaching its decision that such failure to provide corrective med-
ical care constituted neglect and conferred upon the state the privilege
of interfering to have the operation performed, the court stated:
The law is not only zealous in the protection of the civil rights
of infants but has a special regard for the moral care, training andguidance of children ... its beneficence extends also to conservation
of the health of children, their physical well-being, as well as to the
preservation of their lives. (emphasis added).34
31 1 K.B. 216 (1914).
32 Supra note 10.
33 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933).
34 Id. at 553-554.
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Closely following In re Vasko, but arising under a city ordinance,3 5
rather than under the Children's Act of New York of 1922, is In re Rot-
kowitz. 3 6 This case involved a ten-year old child, the father of whom
opposed an operation to correct and prevent extension of a leg deformity
induced by poliomyelitis. The mother of the child brought a petition
charging the father with neglect. The court expressly found the child to
be neglected by the father, relying upon the opinion of Mr. Justice Hag-
arty in In re Vasko, and stating that it was "entirely in accord with those
views." The court then concluded that:
... it was the intention of the legislature to give power to the
Justices of this Court to order an operation not only in an instance
where the life of the child is to be saved but also in instances where
the health, the limb, the person or the future of the child is at
stake.37 (emphasis added)
Still another leading case asserting the state's privilege to interfere
with corrective medical care of its infant citizens is Mitchell v. Davis.38
This case involved a 12-year old boy who was afflicted with pain and
impaired movement from arthritis or complications following rheumatic
fever, whose father was deceased, and whose mother refused to consult
regular physicians and relied solely on home remedies and faith healing.
In deciding that the mother's actions constituted "child neglect" within
the meaning of the Texas statute, the court looked upon providing faith
healing as providing no medical attention.
It may be appreciated that this case asserted not only the privilege
of the state to order corrective medical care of its infant citizens when
their parents refused to do so, but even went so far as to rule that the
corrective medical care provided by the parent must be of a certain
type.
39
Perhaps the most far-reaching corrective medical care case is In re
Carstairs,40 in which the court ordered psychiatric examination of a child
over the objections of its parents. The court held that the parents were
obliged to furnish more than just the necessaries of life, including med-
ical care, and that child neglect includes:
35 Section 85 of Domestic Relations Court Act, Laws 1933, c. 482, of the City of New
York, which reads in part:
Whenever a child within the jurisdiction of the court and under the provisions
of this act appears to the court to be in need of medical or surgical care a suit-
able order may be made for the treatment of such child in its home, in a hospital
or other suitable institution.
36 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
37 Ibid., at 951, 25 N.Y.S. 2d at 627.
38 205 S.W. 2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
39 See also Heineman's Appeal, supra, note 29.
40 115 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952).
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* * , a failure to care, to look after, to guide, to supervise, and
I might even go just one word beyond that-to direct the activities
of a child which will not destroy the child and will not be a menace
to others . . . when a parent is apprised of the conduct of the child
... and does nothing about correcting that conduct that would con-
stitute neglect.41
This is the farthest reaching definition of "neglect" which would invoke
a state's privilege to interfere with medical care of an infant that re-
search has revealed.
Perhaps the criticism levied against such parents who fail to provide
their children with proper corrective medical care has never been so
gracefully phrased as when this court said:
In the Bible it is said-and I say this in the light of what I have
already said,-that this woman is not to be formally charged with
a crime-that if you are warned of the acts of even a dumb animal
and you take no precautions to prevent the dumb animal from re-
peating that conduct, you are charged with the acts of the dumb
animal. I know the language of the Bible, but I would rather para-
phrase it, and I do so. (emphasis added) 42
Conclusions
Since the common law confers no privilege upon the state to inter-
fere with non-emergency medical care of infant citizens against the
wishes of their parents, and since this privilege is conferred only by
statutes enacted under the police power of the individual states, the
problem of when the statutory privilege may be invoked becomes one of
interpretation of each individual state statute. For this reason, it be-
comes difficult to draw any broad generalities as conclusions. However,
even in light of this difficulty, and since the statutes are rather uniform
in scope and effect if not in wording, a few rather general conclusions
may cautiously be drawn.
It is now almost axiomatic that a good faith religious belief is no
defense to failing to provide corrective or preventive medical attention
to infant children. This rule may be narrowed somewhat by the further
conclusion that, although a forceful argument can be presented to the
contrary, faith healing will not suffice as adequate medical attendance,
except in a few eastern states where such beliefs are more widely held.
A good understanding of the current state of the law is found in
Morrison v. State.43 Although this case involved an emergency blood
transfusion rather than non-emergency medical care, its reasoning is
nevertheless applicable to this discussion:
The only real difference, in principle, between that case [In re
Hudson] and this, is that in the Hudson case the operation was ex-
41 Ibid., at 316.
42 Id., at 317.
43 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952).
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tremely dangerous to life, whereas the giving of a blood transfusion
is attendant with a minimum of danger. However, the Washington
court based its decision on the theory that the state had no power
to order medical treatment for an infant against the wishes of its
parents. Where the proposed treatment is dangerous to the life, or
where there is a difference in medical opinion as to the efficacy of
a proposed treatment, or where medical opinion differs as to which
of two or more suggested remedies should be followed, requiring the
exercise of a sound discretion, the opinion of the parents should not
be lightly overriden. . . . The Hudson decision was by a divided
court: three Judges concurring, one concurring in the result, and
three vigorously dissenting. The dissenting opinion is forceful and
well reasoned. We decline to follow that decision. (emphasis
added) .44
Viewed in the light of this reasoning from Morrison v. State,
45 the
law begins to look a little more clear. The reasoning in In re Hudson46
and the cases that followed it has received little or no support from any
jurisdiction other than Washington. 47 On the other hand, the arguments
in favor of extending the statutory privilege to non-emergency medical
care have been resounded and adopted by many authoritative jurisdic-
tions. Therefore, it is suggested that a state has what may be termed
a "discretionary privilege" to interfere with non-emergency medical care
of infant citizens without the consent of their parents.
This discretionary privilege is, by its very nature, an interference
with an extremely personal and delicate relationship, and it must be
invoked only with extreme caution. The task of drawing inflexible rules
that must be complied with in each and every case to invoke the privilege
approaches the impossible as well as the undesirable, due to the great
variance of facts and circumstances from case to case. However, con-
clusions relating to certain factors or elements that may be helpful in
deciding when this statutory discretionary privilege should be invoked
can be properly drawn from this analysis if accompanied by the caution
that the relative importance of each factor or element may vary sub-
stantially from case to case, again depending upon the particular facts
and circumstances involved. In view of this caution and the comments
that have been presented hereinbefore, it is submitted that these factors
are: (1) the probable adverse consequences to the infant and to others
of refraining to invoke the privilege; (2) the probability of the operation
materially improving the child's condition; (3) the reasonable choice of
the parent(s) in any discretionary matters; (4) the degree of danger and
uniformity of competent medical opinion regarding the proposed treat-
ment; and (5) the need for and availability of cooperation of the child.
44 Ibid., at 102.
45 Id.
46 Supra note 21.
47 Note, op. cit. supra note 4 at footnote 21.
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